


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#### Switch from administratively determined support levels to auctions

Demanded levels of remuneration dramatically decreased with introduction of RES Auctions




- > Auctions have revealed significant cost reduction potentials
- > New RES not necessarily more expensive than new fossil plants (not directly comparable, though, because of intermittency)



#### Role of RES and Europe's climate targets

How to reach 80% GHG reduction in Europe until 2050 in a *cost-optimal* manner? – First insights from a study for German government



> To achieve climate targets, significant increase in RES generation (and almost no new fossil gen.) is efficient in medium and long term



- Carbon prices inconsistent with long term targets
- > carbon price levels consistent with 80% targets (e.g. EUR 35 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2030, EUR 100 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2050) far higher than today's prices and projections for near future
  - » carbon price as a "political price" highly uncertain
- > consequently, current power market prices offer no cost recovery for RES investments with near-by commissioning dates
  - » however: several projections see increase in price levels within next ten years → but still too far away to trigger purely market-based investments
- Learning curve effects might have public good character
- Uncertainties and delays in grid expansion
- "Support" for conventional generation might distort level-playing-field
- Risk-aversity of traditional RES investors



- Carbon prices inconsistent with long term targets
- Learning curve effects might have public good character
  - > competitors cannot be fully excluded from technology gains
    - » patents etc. offer only partial protection
  - > might result in an underinvestment in RES technologies
    - » especially R&D might remain at an insufficient level
  - > particularly relevant for technologies with steep learning curves
- Uncertainties and delays in grid expansion
- "Support" for conventional generation might distort level-playing-field
- Risk-aversity of traditional RES investors



- Carbon prices inconsistent with long term targets
- Learning curve effects might have public good character
- Uncertainties and delays in grid expansion
  - > massive European-wide grid expansion together with optimal RES siting likely to deliver cost-optimal energy system transformation
    - » public acceptance for grid expansion is very low, however
    - » regulatory decisions on grid expansion planning not necessarily based on economic rationality
  - > barriers to purely market-based RES investments might be two-fold
    - » no reliable grid connection/access available for best sites
    - » investments at sites with lower productivity might be devalued in the future if grid expansion can be realized
- "Support" for conventional generation might distort level-playing-field
- Risk-aversity of traditional RES investors



- Carbon prices inconsistent with long term targets
- Learning curve effects might have public good character
- Uncertainties and delays in grid expansion
- "Support" for conventional generation might distort level-playing-field
  - > low wholesale prices have negatively affected revenues of conventional power generation
    - » early retirement, low level of new investment
  - > (at least) suspected risks for security of supply → general debate on electricity market design in Europe
  - > many major countries are introducing capacity remuneration mechanisms
    - » RES often not fully eligible for those mechanisms
  - > inherent risk that capacity payments constitute some kind of subsidy for fossil generation → reducing market prices and earnings potentials for RES
  - Risk-aversity of traditional RES investors



- Carbon prices inconsistent with long term targets
- Learning curve effects might have public good character
- Uncertainties and delays in grid expansion
- "Support" for conventional generation might distort level-playing-field
- Risk-aversity of traditional RES investors
  - > up to now, financing of RES investments often differs significantly from financing of market-based generation
    - » project finance
    - » very low levels of equity
    - » private investors and small companies → low securities/collaterals
    - » funding by public banks
  - > FIT/sliding market premium support schemes enabled such financing structures by strictly limiting risk exposure of investors
  - > market-based investments would likely require other financing and ownership structures → not impossible, but will take time



# RES support schemes based on well-designed tendering processes appropriate solution for the time being

### competitive support schemes safeguard ambitious transformation process, but can pave the way for market-based investments

- > support for RES investments becomes a scarce good → will incentivize innovations and reveal cost-saving potentials → higher public acceptance for RES support
- > risk exposure for investors could be gradually increased if desired (e.g. fixed premium, technological neutrality, cross-border competition)
- > competitive process will also reveal optimal ownership structure (finance, acceptance, project management)

#### careful design of RES auctions is crucial success factor

- > past auctions often resulted in poor quotas of timely realized projects
  - » auction design will have to include sufficient incentive schemes (penalties backed by securities) for project realization even if circumstances turn out to be unfavorable
  - » trade-off between low demanded support levels and project realization
- > important differences among RES technologies beyond required support level
  - » differences in market and grid integration costs → externalities
  - » project risks, permit procedures, realization periods



#### Different RES technologies might require tailor-made auction design

#### One-size-fits-all solutions unlikely

### Offshore Wind

- installation sites publicly owned and a scarce resource themselves
- > in Germany: planning and construction periods for DC grid connection and necessary onshore grid reinforcement >> planning and construction period for offshore wind farms
- > huge investments, high planning costs, low competition
- > uncertain technological development
- > administrative pre-development of projects (like in NL, DK, DE after interim period) and grid connection → tendering at the end of pre-development phase

#### Ground-Mounted Solar

- > typically no permits necessary or permits easy to achieve
- > abundance of available sites → environmental concerns might be limiting factor
- > typical construction periods < 6 months
- > broad range of investors, producers, service providers
- > simple tendering scheme with limited realization periods, low levels of prequalification and high flexibility for bidders

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